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Abstract
We present a dynamical theory of opinion formation that takes explic-
itly into account the structure of the social network in which individuals
are embedded. The theory predicts the evolution of a set of opinions
through the social network and establishes the existence of a martingale
property, i.e. the expected weighted fraction of the population that holds
a given opinion is constant in time. Most importantly, this weighted frac-
tion is not either zero or one, but corresponds to a non-trivial distribution
of opinions in the long time limit. This coexistence of opinions within a
social network is in agreement with the often observed locality effect, in
which an opinion or a fad is localized to given groups without infecting
the whole society. We verified these predictions as well as others con-
cerning the fragility of opinions and the importance of highly connected
individuals by computer experiments on scale-free networks.
1 Introduction
Most people hold opinions about a myriad topics, from politics and entertain-
ment to health and the lives of others. These opinions can be either the result of
serious reflection or, as is often the case when information is hard to process or
access, formed through interactions with others that hold views on given issues.
This reliance on others to form opinions lies at the heart of advertising through
social cues, efforts to make people aware of societal and health related issues,
fads that sweep social groups and organizations, and attempts at capturing the
votes and minds of people in election years.
Because of our dependence on other’s to shape our views of the world, an
understanding of opinion formation requires an examination of the interplay
between the structure of the social network in which individuals are embedded
and the interactions that take place within it. This explains the vast efforts
that both the commercial and the public sectors devote to uncovering such in-
terplay and the mechanisms they deploy to affect the formation of favorable
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and unfavorable opinions about any imaginable topic. More recently, the emer-
gence of email and global access to information through the web has started
the change the discourse in civil society [4, 20, 22, 23, 29]. and made it even
easier to propagate points of view and misleading facts through vast numbers
of people; views which are surprisingly accepted and transmitted on to others
without much critical examination.
In the academic arena there exist several models of opinion formation that
take into account some factors while leaving out others (for one the earliest see
[8]). In economics, information cascades were proposed to explain uniformity
in social behavior [1, 2], as well as its fragility. This approach assumes that
there is a linear sequence of Bayesian individuals that can observe the choices of
others in front of them before making their own decisions as to which opinion to
choose. Besides the notorious problems with assuming Bayesian decision mak-
ers [3] this theory makes unrealistic assumptions, such as assuming a sequence
of synchronous decisions that does not take into account the social network, or
locality, of contacts that people have. More problematic is the prediction that
given an initial set of possible opinions, the information cascade will lead to one
opinion eventually becoming pervasive, which contradicts the common obser-
vation that conformity throughout a society tends to be localized in subgroups
rather than widespread.
Other approaches to opinion formation have dealt with either theoretical
models or computer simulations. On the theory side a number of dynamical
models that have been proposed are based on analogies to magnetic systems
placed either on a continuum or on a two dimensional lattices [16] or on a discrete
many-state space [11, 13, 7]. While none of them takes into account the social
structure in shaping opinion formation, on the side of computer simulations,
models that have a continuum of possible opinions or very large number of
opinions can sometimes yield asymptotic states that are non-uniform [5, 16, 25,
26, 10], partly due to the many choices of opinions. However, all models with a
binary choice of opinions do lead to widespread dominance [12, 13, 27, 14, 18, 28],
once again in disagreement with observations.
In this paper we propose a theory of opinion formation that explicitly takes
into account the structure of the social network in which individuals are em-
bedded. The theory assumes asynchronous choices by individuals among two or
three opinions and it predicts the time evolution of the set of opinions from any
arbitrary initial condition. We show that under very general conditions a mar-
tingale property ensues, i.e. the expected weighted fraction of the population
that holds a given opinion is constant in time. By weighted fraction we mean
the fraction of individuals holding a given opinion, averaged over their social
connectivity (degree). Most importantly, this weighted fraction is not either
zero or one, but corresponds to a non-trivial distribution in the long time limit.
This coexistence of opinions within a social network is in agreement with the
often observed locality effect, in which an opinion or a fad is localized to given
groups without infecting the whole society.
Our theory further predicts that a relatively small number of individuals with
high social ranks can have a larger effect on opinion formation than individuals
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with low rank. By high rank we mean people with a large number of social
connections. This explains naturally the fragility phenomenon, whereby an
opinion that seems to be held by a rather large group of people can become
nearly extinct in a very short time, a mechanism that is at the heart of fads.
These predictions were verified by computer experiments and extended to
the case when some individuals hold fixed opinions throughout the dynami-
cal process. Furthermore, we dealt with the case of information asymmetries,
which are characterized by the fact that some individuals are often influenced
by other people’s opinions while being unable to reciprocate and change their
counterpart’s views.
In the following sections we describe the dynamical model and proceed to
solve it analytically. We then extend it to several interesting cases (fixed opin-
ions and information asymmetries) and then present the results of computer
simulations that confirm the theoretical predictions. A concluding section sum-
marizes our results and discusses their implications to opinion formation and
possible future research.
2 Two opinions within a social network
2.1 Description of the model
In our theory we represent a social network as a connected random graph with
a certain degree distribution pk. The nodes of this graph correspond to people
and the edges represent their social connection. We assume that the graph is
entirely random except for its degree distribution, which means that the degree
of each node is drawn independently from the distribution pk, and any two
graphs with the same degree sequence are equally likely in the sample space.
This point is made clear in Section II of [21]. In the following discussion we also
assume that the structure of the social network changes over time scales that
are much slower than opinion formation, so that for all practical purposes the
graph structure can be considered static over the time that opinions form.
We use the terms “black” and “white” to denote the binary opinions available
to each person, who is represented by a node. A person (node) is either of the
black or of the white opinion. We then assume that starting from an initial color
distribution, people asynchronously update their opinions at a rate λ. That
is, during any time interval dt, each node updates its color (makes a decision
as to which opinion to hold) with probability λdt, based on the colors of its
neighbors. Specifically, if a given person or node has b black neighbors and w
white neighbors, then the probability that its new color is going to be black is
b/(b+w). This is equivalent to assume that each time a person randomly chooses
one of its neighbors and sets its new color to be the same as that neighbor. Note
that when we say that a person or node “updates”, we do not mean “changes”.
It is completely possible that a node remains the same color after the update.
With this opinion adoption mechanism in place and a given social structure
we now determine how opinions spread throughout the as a function of time.
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Table 1: Symbols and their meanings
n total number of nodes
nk number of nodes with degree k
pk = nk/n the degree distribution
m total number of black nodes
mk number of black nodes with degree k
q = m/n fraction of black nodes
qk = mk/nk fraction of black nodes in all degree-k nodes
As we show, which opinion (or color) will prevail is not obvious, as well as how
the ratio of black-to-white changes with time?
We will first consider the case where once the opinion formation starts,
no new sources of opinions enter the social network. We will then relax this
assumption by allowing for new opinions to enter into a social network as time
evolves.
Throughout this paper we will use the following symbols and their meaning,
which are listed in Table 1.
2.2 The dynamics of opinion formation
Consider a specific update that happens at some time t. Let A be the person
or node that updates, and let k be its degree. Because all n nodes update
their colors asynchronously and independently of each other at the same rate,
everyone has the same chance to be observed updating at time t. Thus the
degree distribution of A is just the degree distribution of a randomly chosen
node, or pk. During the update, A randomly copies the color from one of its
neighbors, which we will call B. We calculate the change of mk due to this
specific update. There are three cases:
1. A is white and B is black. A updates its color to black and consequently
increases mk by 1.
2. A is black and B is white. A updates its color to white and consequently
decreases mk by 1.
3. A and B have the same color. In this case mk does not change.
Given A’s degree k, the probability that A is black or white before the update
is simply qk or 1− qk by definition. To calculate the black probability of B we
need to know its degree distribution first, which in our case is not pk. This is
because A being a randomly chosen node is more likely to be a neighbor of a
high degree node than a low degree node. Specifically, the probability that B
has degree j is proportional to jpj [9]. Conditioning on the event that B has
degree j, the black probability of B is again simply qj .
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Thus, the probability that the update changes a degree-k node from white
to black (case 1) is given by
Pw→b(k) = pk(1− qk)
∑
j jpjqj∑
j jpj
. (1)
Similarly, the probability that the update changes a degree-k node from black
to white (case 2) is given by
Pb→w(k) = pkqk
∑
j jpj(1− qj)∑
j jpj
= pkqk
(
1−
∑
j jpjqj∑
j jpj
)
. (2)
If we define
〈q〉 =
∑
j jpjqj∑
j jpj
(3)
to be a weighted average over all qk’s, then the two probabilities can be written
as
Pw→b(k) = pk(1 − qk)〈q〉, (4)
Pb→w(k) = pkqk(1 − 〈q〉). (5)
This gives us the increment of mk due to a particular update:
∆mk =


+1 with probability pk(1− qk)〈q〉
−1 with probability pkqk(1− 〈q〉)
0 otherwise
. (6)
Note that the updating process of the whole network (not just one node)
is a Poisson process of rate nλ. Hence the increment of mk in a time interval
(t, t+ dt) is given by
∆mk =


+1 with probability nk(1− qk)〈q〉λdt
−1 with probability nkqk(1− 〈q〉)λdt
0 otherwise
, (7)
where we used the fact nk = npk.
We can now calculate the expectation and variance of the random variable
∆mk. Its expectation is given by
E[∆mk] = nk(1− qk)〈q〉λdt − nkqk(1− 〈q〉)λdt = nk(〈q〉 − qk)λdt. (8)
Its second moment is equal to
E[(∆mk)
2] = nk(1− qk)〈q〉λdt + nkqk(1− 〈q〉)λdt
= nk(〈q〉 + qk − 2〈q〉qk)λdt. (9)
Hence the variance is given by
var[∆mk] = E[(∆mk)
2]− (E[∆mk])2
= nk(〈q〉+ qk − 2〈q〉qk)λdt+ o(dt)
= nkσ
2
kλdt+ o(dt), (10)
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where
σ2k ≡ 〈q〉+ qk − 2〈q〉qk. (11)
By definition, qk = mk/nk, so we have (to dt order)
E[∆qk] =
1
nk
E[∆mk] = (〈q〉 − qk)λdt, (12)
and
var[∆qk] =
1
n2k
var[∆mk] =
1
nk
σ2kλdt. (13)
The increment step of ∆qk is 1/nk. When n is large this step is small, and
Eq. (12) and (13) can be approximated by a continuous process described by
the following stochastic differential equation
dqk = (〈q〉 − qk)λdt + 1√
nk
σk
√
λdB
(k)
t , (14)
where B
(k)
t are k independent Brownian motions. From now on we redefine the
time unit so that λ = 1. Then Eq. (14) becomes
dqk = (〈q〉 − qk)dt+ 1√
nk
σkdB
(k)
t . (15)
which is the set of equations that governs the dynamics of the social network.
2.3 The solution
2.3.1 Martingale
The quantities qk and 〈q〉 in Eq. (15) are all random variables, and σk is nonlinear
in qk. As a result Eq. (15) is very hard to solve. However, observe that if we
take the weighted average (see Eq. (3)) of both sides of Eq. (15), we obtain
d〈q〉 = 〈 1√
nk
σkdB
(k)
t 〉, (16)
or
〈q(t)〉 =
∫ t
0
〈 1√
nk
σkdB
(k)
s 〉 =
(∑
k
kpk
)
−1∑
k
kpk√
nk
∫ t
0
σkdB
(k)
s . (17)
Because the right hand side does not include the dt term, 〈q〉 is a martingale.
Thus its expectation value does not change with time:
E[〈q(t)〉] = constant. (18)
Note that 〈q(t)〉 is a positive martingale bounded by 1. From the continuous-
time martingale convergence theorem [17] it follows that 〈q(t)〉 converges to a
stable distribution as t→∞, not necessarily a constant.
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2.3.2 The large n limit
When n is large n
−1/2
k is small, so that we can neglect the fluctuation term in
Eq. (15) and write
dqk
dt
= 〈q〉 − qk. (19)
This amounts to a mean-field approximation. We divide the nodes into different
groups according to their degrees, so that all nodes in the same group have the
same degree. If when n is large the size nk of each group is also large, then
we can approximately neglect the fluctuations within each group and replace
the group-wise random variables mk, qk by their mean values. In this sense
Eq. (19) can be regarded as a set of normal differential equations which contain
deterministic variables only.
Since 〈q〉 is now deterministic, Eq. (18) becomes
〈q〉 = constant. (20)
Thus Eq. (19) can be easily solved. The solution is
qk(t) = qk(0)e
−t + 〈q(0)〉(1− e−t). (21)
We see that for each k,
lim
t→∞
qk(t) = 〈q〉. (22)
Because q =
∑
nkqk/
∑
nk is a simple average over qk, we have from Eq. (21)
q(t) = q(0)e−t + q(0)(1 − e−t) (23)
and
lim
t→∞
q(t) = 〈q〉. (24)
2.4 Interpretation of the solution
A direct corollary of Eq. (18) is that if one starts with a nontrivial initial distri-
bution of opinions (i.e., the nodes are not all black or all white), then on average
no opinion will dominate in the end. This rather surprising result was tested in
a computer experiment described in Section 2.5.
In general the overall fraction of black nodes q is not equal to 〈q〉, so it can
change with time. Eq. (24) shows that q approaches 〈q〉 as time goes on. To put
it more clearly, suppose at t = 0 the network is colored in some way such that
q 6= 〈q〉, then averagely speaking, as time passes 〈q〉 stays at its initial value,
while q keeps moving towards 〈q〉. This is also confirmed by simulation.
To better compare q and 〈q〉 we rewrite their definitions as
q =
m
n
=
∑
mk∑
nk
; (25)
〈q〉 =
∑
kpkqk∑
kpk
=
∑
knkqk∑
knk
=
∑
kmk∑
knk
. (26)
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It becomes clear that in the weighted average 〈q〉, each node is given a weight
k equal to its degree. Thus, Eq. (24) and (26) says that a high-degree node
contributes more to the final fraction of colors (decisions) than a low-degree
node. Quantitatively, the contribution of every node is proportional to its degree.
In other words, high-degree nodes are more influential. This explains why a
relatively small number of people with high social ranks can affect a significant
proportion of the whole society in their decision making.
We emphasize that our theory explains, rather than assumes why high-rank
nodes are more influential in affecting opinion formation than low rank nodes.
In fact, in our model when a node updates its color, it puts equal weight on all its
neighbors. The chance that it will get the color from a high-degree neighbor and
the chance that it will get from a low-degree neighbor are the same. However,
statistically speaking there are more nodes in the network that are affected by
any high-degree node. In other words, people with higher social rank are more
influential because more people pay attention to them. Notice that this not the
same as ascribing a higher weight to the single opinion of a high-rank member
of the group.
Furthermore the fragility of opinion formation that our theory exhibits stems
from the possibility that a relatively small number of nodes contribute a signif-
icant proportion to the weighted 〈q〉, thus changing the whole network dramat-
ically. This effect was also tested by computer simulations which we will show
in the next section.
2.5 Computer simulations
2.5.1 Network creation
The results derived in the previous sections apply to arbitrary degree distri-
butions. However, in order to stress the degree effect, we performed all our
simulations on a connected power-law network of size n = 104 and α = 2.7,
whose (continuous) degree distribution is given by pk = (α − 1)k−α, k ≥ 1. A
sample degree distribution for such a network is shown in Fig. 1.
2.5.2 Random colored network
We first created a random network as described and randomly assigned 70%
of the nodes to be black and 30% to be white. We then randomly picked one
node in the network and randomly updated its color to be the color of one
of its neighbors. This “pick-and-update” step was repeated 106 times so that
on average each node got updated 100 times, which is a rather large number
for a network of this size. These 106 steps constitute a “sample path” of the
stochastic process, along which both q and 〈q〉 were calculated as functions of t.
We repeated this experiment 100 times, each time on regenerated networks,
so that 100 sample paths were collected. Three of those sample paths are shown
in Fig. 2 and 3. As can be seen from the figures, 〈q〉 has a larger variance than
q.
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Figure 1: Degree distribution of a network with size 104 and α = 2.7.
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t
Figure 2: Evolution of the fraction of black nodes, q, on a free random network.
The unit of time, t, is 104 rounds. The three fraction curves are calculated
along three different sample paths, each path sampled on a distinct network.
As can be seen none of the three curves reaches 0 or 1 after 100× 104 rounds,
suggesting a nontrivial limit distribution.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the weighted fraction of black nodes, 〈q〉, on a free random
network. The unit of time, t, is 104 rounds. The three weighted fraction curves
are calculated along the same three sample paths as in Fig. 2.
If we take the average of q(t) and the 〈q(t)〉 over all 100 sample paths we
get estimates for Eq(t) and E〈q(t)〉. These are shown in Fig. 4. It is clear that
both Eq and E〈q〉 do not change with time, which confirms the prediction of a
martingale in Eq. (18).
2.5.3 Nonrandom color modification
To show that a significant proportion of nodes can be affected by a small number
of high-degree nodes, we performed the following experiment. As in Section
2.5.2, we first created a random network, and then randomly assigned 70% of
its nodes to be black and 30% to be white. We then manually assigned the 100
highest-degree nodes to the color white. Because these 100 nodes constitute only
1% of the whole network and some of them were originally white before the
manual assignment, only less than 1% proportion of the network is affected. In
other words, the change of q due to the manual step was less than 1%, which can
be neglected. On the other hand, because the 100 high-degree nodes contribute
a significant weight to the weighted average, the change in the value of 〈q〉 is
significant and cannot be neglected. In fact, 〈q〉 was lowered from 0.7 to about
0.55 by the color modification.
The rest steps remain the same as in Section 2.5.2. We again collected 100
sample paths, three of which are shown in Fig. 5 and 6.
We also take the sample averages of q and 〈q〉 and plot them as functions of
time (Fig. 7). It can be seen that E〈q〉 again does not change with time, which
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Figure 4: The expected fraction of black nodes (red line) and the expected
weighted fraction of black nodes (green line) do not change with time. The
expectations are estimated by averaging over 100 sample paths.
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t
Figure 5: Evolution of the fraction of black nodes, q, on a free network with the
100 highest-degree nodes set to white. The unit of time is 104 rounds. The three
fraction curves are again calculated along three sample paths on three distinct
networks.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the weighted fraction of black nodes, 〈q〉, on a free
network with the 100 highest-degree nodes set to white. The unit of time is 104
rounds. The three fraction curves are calculated along the same three sample
paths as in Fig. 5.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the expected value of the fraction of black nodes, Eq,
towards the expected weighted fraction E〈q〉 as a function of time. At the
beginning Eq = 0.7 and E〈q〉 = 0.55. The equilibrium Eq = E〈q〉 = 0.55 is
reached after about 10 × 104 rounds, i.e., after each node updates its color 10
times on average.
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further confirms Eq. (18). It is also seen that Eq approaches E〈q〉 as time goes
on, as predicted by Eq. (24).
3 Social networks with a sprinkle of fixed opin-
ions
3.1 Dynamical equations
So far we have assumed that the network is free in the sense that every person-
node can change its color at will any number of times. We now extend our
model to allow a fraction of the people to have fixed opinions, which translates
into nodes with fixed colors. These recalcitrant people or nodes can be regarded
as “sources” of the network, in the sense that they can affect others but they
themselves cannot be affected by the opinion of others. In a social context,
these nodes correspond to “decided” people while the other nodes correspond
to “undecided” people.
Let bk be the proportion of degree-k nodes that stay black forever, and let
wk be the proportion of degree-k nodes that stay white forever. The remaining
1−bk−wk proportion of degree-k nodes are free to change their colors as before.
We now study what the final outcome is going to be for this more realistic case.
The difference between a free network and a network with sources is that in
the latter case when we randomly choose a node to update, we have to make
sure it is free and thus can be updated. Suppose a degree-k node is chosen. At
the moment it is chosen, there are nk(1− qk) white nodes with degree k, among
which nkwk are not free. Therefore the probability that a free white node is
chosen is
nk(1− qk)− nkwk
nk
= 1− qk − wk. (27)
Hence we need to replace 1− qk by 1− qk − wk in Eq. (4) to obtain
Pw→b(k) = pk(1− qk − wk)〈q〉, (28)
Similarly, Eq. (5) is modified to
Pb→w(k) = pk(qk − bk)(1 − 〈q〉). (29)
Repeating the steps in the previous section, we can reach a set of dynamical
equations similar to Eq. (15):
dqk = [〈q〉 − qk + bk(1− 〈q〉) − wk〈q〉]dt+ 1√
nk
σkdB
(k)
t , (30)
where σk is a complicated function of qk which we do not write out. When
bk = wk = 0 Eq. (30) becomes Eq. (15).
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3.2 The solution
Taking the weighted average on both sides of Eq. (30), we have
d〈q〉 = [bk(1 − 〈q〉)− wk〈q〉]dt + 〈 1√
nk
σkdB
(k)
t 〉. (31)
Hence 〈q〉 is no longer a martingale. If we again apply the mean-field approxi-
mation to neglect the fluctuation terms, we get
d〈q〉
dt
= 〈b〉(1 − 〈q〉)− 〈w〉〈q〉. (32)
The equilibrium condition is obtained by setting the right hand side equal to
zero (q∞ = q(t =∞)):
〈b〉(1− 〈q∞〉)− 〈w〉〈q∞〉 = 0, (33)
which gives
〈q∞〉 = 〈b〉〈b〉+ 〈w〉 . (34)
Therefore as t → ∞, 〈q(t)〉 converges to a fixed fraction equal to the weighted
proportion of non-free black nodes among all non-free nodes. We see that the
final proportion does not depend on the random initial assignment of the colors
of the free nodes, although it is possible that the convergence needs such a
long time that it can never be reached in reality. Anyway, Eq. (34) shows that
the weighted average again plays an important role, indicating that high-degree
nodes are more influential to the final outcome.
4 The effect of undecided individuals
4.1 Model
In the first two models we assumed that each person or node can make decisions
repeatedly for any number of times. However, in some circumstances, once a
node makes a decision it remains unchanged during the whole process of opinion
formation. Accordingly, we will now assume that there are two kinds of people
or nodes, decided and undecided. A decided node has opinion either black or
white, which does not change with time, while an undecided node has no color
at the beginning but can obtain one from one of his neighbors after an update
of its state. Once it gets a color, it becomes decided and its color stays fixed
forever. To conclude, each node has three possible states: black, white and
undecided.
As before, at each step we randomly pick a node from the network and check
its state. If it already has a color (decided), we do nothing. If it is undecided,
we randomly pick one of its neighbor. If that neighbor is also undecided, we
again do nothing, otherwise we update the first node’s color to be the same as
its neighbor’s.
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4.2 Solution
Let bk and wk be the proportion of black and white nodes in the network,
respectively. e assume that bk + wk < 1 at t = 0 so that there are a finite
number of undecided nodes at the beginning.
We calculate the probability that the number of k-degree black nodes will be
increased by one during an update. For this to happen, first we have to choose
an undecided node in step 1, which happens with probability 1− bk − wk, and
then its neighbor we choose in step 2 has to be black, which happens with
probability
∑
kpkbk/
∑
kpk. Thus we have (again neglecting the fluctuation
term by mean-field approximation)
dbk
dt
= (1− bk − wk)〈b〉, (35)
and similarly
dwk
dt
= (1 − bk − wk)〈w〉. (36)
Eq. (35) and (36) govern the dynamics of the system.
Taking the weighted average of Eq. (35) and (36), we obtain
d〈b〉
dt
= (1− 〈b〉 − 〈w〉)〈b〉, (37)
and
d〈w〉
dt
= (1− 〈b〉 − 〈w〉)〈w〉. (38)
To solve Eq. (37) and (37), we take their sum and define f = 1 − 〈b〉 − 〈w〉 to
get
df
dt
= f(1− f). (39)
Now f can be solve as
f(t) =
1− f0
f0et + 1− f0 , (40)
where f0 = f(0) = 1−〈b(0)〉−〈w(0)〉. Putting this back into Eq. (37) and (38),
we can solve out 〈b〉 and 〈w〉, which we write down here:
〈b〉 = 〈b(0)〉e
t
f0et + 1− f0 , 〈w〉 =
〈w(0)〉et
f0et + 1− f0 . (41)
Hence
〈b(t)〉
〈w(t)〉 =
〈b(0)〉
〈w(0)〉 = const. (42)
We see that the weighted black-to-white ratio does not change with time. In
fact, this can be seen from Eq. (37) and (38) directly, where the increments of
〈b〉 and 〈w〉 is proportional to 〈b〉 and 〈w〉, respectively.
15
Figure 8: A directed graph. The arrow marks the direction of information flow.
For example, A points to C means C can get information from A but not the
other way.
5 Remarks
5.1 Information asymmetries
Since our model makes no assumption about the degree distribution, it applies
to all kinds of networks including power-law networks and exponential networks.
Furthermore, we can further extend our model to describe informational asym-
metries in such a way that it is possible for A to get information from B but B
cannot get information from A. This corresponds to the study of our model on
a directed graph and is illustrated in Fig. 8. In this example B,C,D,E can get
information from A but A can only get information from D. A directed graph
resembles more closely a real life social network, in which low-rank people pay
more attention to high-rank people than the other way around.
To generalize our model for undirected graphs, from the point of view of
our notation we need to do is to replace the numerous appearances of “degree”
by “outgoing degree” in Table 1. As an example, pk now stands for “outgoing
degree distribution”. We point out that the outgoing degree distribution of a
directed graph can be very different from the degree distribution of the same
graph viewed as an undirected graph. For example, node D in Fig. 1 has
outgoing degree 1 as a directed graph but degree 3 as an undirected graph.
Under the new definition, all our previous results still hold.
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6 Discussion
In this paper we presented a theory of opinion formation that explicitly takes
into account the structure of the social network in which individuals are em-
bedded. The theory assumes asynchronous choices by individuals among two
or three opinions and it predicts the time evolution of the set of opinions from
any arbitrary initial condition. We showed that under very general conditions
a martingale property ensues, i.e. the expected weighted fraction of the popu-
lation that holds a given opinion is constant in time. By weighted fraction we
mean the fraction of individuals holding a given opinion, averaged over their
social connectivity (degree).1 Most importantly, this weighted fraction is not
either zero or one, but corresponds to a non-trivial distribution in the long time
limit. This coexistence of opinions within a social network is in agreement with
the often observed locality effect, in which an opinion or a fad is localized to
given groups without infecting the whole society.
Our theory further predicts that a relatively small number of individuals with
high social ranks can have a larger effect on opinion formation than individuals
with low rank. By high rank we mean people with a large number of social
connections. This explains naturally a fragility phenomenon frequently noted
within societies, whereby an opinion that seems to be held by a rather large
group of people can become nearly extinct in a very short time, a mechanism
that is at the heart of fads.
These predictions were verified by computer experiments and extended to
the case when some individuals hold fixed opinions throughout the dynami-
cal process. Furthermore, we dealt with the case of information asymmetries,
which are characterized by the fact that some individuals are often influenced
by other people’s opinions while being unable to reciprocate and change their
counterpart’s views.
While the assumption of only two or three opinions within a social network
may seem restrictive, there are many real world instances where people basically
choose among points of view. Examples are elections in two party systems,
management fads which consultants and executives need to decide whether to
implement or not, and highly polarized attitudes towards government actions
in many social settings. Our finding that social structure and ranking do affect
the formation of these opinions and that they can coexist with each other are
in agreement with many empirical observations.
Our findings also cast doubt on the applicability of tipping models to a
number of consumer behaviors [15]. While there are clear thresholds in the
spread of innovations when network externalities are at play [24, 19] it is not
clear that the same phenomenon is observed in situations where externalities
are not at play. In most of the consumer behaviors that have been “explained”
by tipping point ideas one still observes the coexistence of the old and the new
1Note that in the context of epidemic control Dezso and Barabasi established a similar
result that it is more efficient to cure the high degree nodes first [6, 7]. However, they did
not give a quantitative definition of importance like our proportional relation, nor did they
propose any convergence law.
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preference or opinions over long times, in contrast with the sudden onset seen
in the case of positive externalities.
We thank Lada Adamic and Chenyang Wang for some useful suggestions.
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